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ABSTRACT: In my 2009 book Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine, I argued that 
morality is objective in several distinct though overlapping senses, and I further 
maintained that questions about the objectivity of  morality are substantive moral 
questions (albeit usually at high levels of  abstraction). In the course of  that book, 
I made several laudatory references to Ronald Dworkin’s well-known 1996 article 
‘Objectivity and Truth’ as well as to some of  his other writings. In regard to the 
two main themes of  my book that have just been mentioned, I took myself  to be 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
occasionally to his work, it makes clear my esteem for his reconception of  meta-ethics 
as a branch of  ethics. At a few other junctures in my 2009 volume, however, I criticized 
Dworkin. My criticisms were focused not on his legal philosophy – with which I have 
sustainedly taken issue elsewhere – but instead on some of  his ethical positions. One 
such position to which I took exception is his value-monism. That is, I took exception 
to his opting for the hedgehog side of  the ancient hedgehog/fox dichotomy that was 
made famous in modern times by Isaiah Berlin. Dworkin’s allegiance to the former 
side of  that dichotomy is starkly proclaimed by the title of  his sprawlingly ambitious 
recent book Justice for Hedgehogs. In what follows, I will leave aside many sections 
of  that impressive tome in order to concentrate on the main portion that deals with 
meta-ethics and on one portion that deals with the putative unity of  value. Given that 
I am almost entirely in agreement with the former portion and largely in disagreement 
with the latter, this brief  review will naturally impugn Dworkin’s assumption that his 
anti-Archimedeanism and his value-monism are integrally connected.
Keywords: ??????????????????????????? ????????????
?  Professor of  Legal & Political Philosophy, Cambridge University Fellow and Director of  Studies in 
Law, Churchill College (Cambridge) Director of  Cambridge Forum for Legal & Political Philosophy.
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TRABAJANDO EN EL INTERIOR: LA FILOSOFÍA MORAL DE RONALD DWORKIN
RESUMEN: En mi libro de 2009 ‘Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine’, argumenté 
que la moral es objetiva en varios sentidos distintos que se solapan, y luego sostuve _ 
que las preguntas sobre la objetividad de la moral son cuestiones morales sustantivas 
(aunque por lo general en los altos niveles de abstracción). En el curso de ese libro, 
he hecho varias referencias elogiosas a conocido artículo de 1996 de Ronald Dworkin 
‘Objectivity and Truth’ , así como a algunos de sus otros escritos. En lo que respecta a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????? ?????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
en cuando a su trabajo, se deja en claro mi estima por su nueva concepción de la meta-
ética como una rama de la ética. En algunos otros momentos en mi texto de 2009, sin 
????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
– con el que me he tomado sostenida tema en otro lugar – sino que en algunas de sus 
posiciones éticas. Una tal posición a la que hice excepción es su valor del monismo. 
Esto es, que hice excepción a su opción por el lado erizo de la antigua dicotomía erizo 
/ zorro que se hizo famosa en los tiempos modernos por Isaiah Berlin. Dworkin es leal 
a la antigua lado de esa dicotomía, así también ha sido aclamada de forma ambiciosa 
en su ‘Justice for Hedgehogs’. En lo que sigue, voy a dejar de lado muchas de las 
?????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
que se ocupa de la meta-ética y en una parte que se ocupa de la unidad putativa de 
valor. Teniendo en cuenta que estoy casi totalmente de acuerdo con la parte anterior y 
en gran parte en desacuerdo con este último, esta breve reseña, naturalmente pretende 
impugnar la hipótesis de que la lealtad de Dworkin en su anti-arquimedianismo y el 
valor del monismo están conectados íntegramente
Palabras clave: Filosofía del derecho, Filosofía, Realismo moral
1. INTRODUCTION
In my book Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine1, I argue that morality is objective 
in several distinct though overlapping senses, and I further maintain that questions 
about the objectivity of  morality are substantive moral questions (albeit usually at high 
levels of  abstraction). In the course of  that book, I make several laudatory references 
to Ronald Dworkin’s well-known article ‘Objectivity and Truth’2 as well as to some of  
1  KRAMER, Matthew. Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
2  DWORKIN, Ronald. “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It”, in: ?????????????????????? ?????? 25, 
1996, pp. 87-139.
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his other writings. In regard to the two main themes of  my book that have just been 
?????????????????? ????? ????????????????????????? ??????????????? ??????????????????
Moral Doctrine adverts only occasionally to his work, it makes clear my esteem for his 
reconception of  meta-ethics as a branch of  ethics.
At a few other junctures in my 2009 volume, however, I criticize Dworkin. My 
criticisms are focused not on his legal philosophy – with which I have sustainedly taken 
issue elsewhere3 – but instead on some of  his ethical positions4. One such position to 
which I take exception is his value-monism. That is, I take exception to his opting for 
the hedgehog side of  the ancient hedgehog/fox dichotomy made famous in modern 
times by Isaiah Berlin. Dworkin’s allegiance to the former side of  that dichotomy is 
starkly proclaimed by the title of  his sprawlingly ambitious recent book Justice for 
Hedgehogs5. In what follows, I will leave aside many sections of  that impressive tome 
in order to concentrate on the main portion that deals with meta-ethics and on one 
portion that deals with the putative unity of  value. Given that I am almost entirely in 
agreement with the former portion and largely in disagreement with the latter, this 
brief  review will naturally impugn Dworkin’s assumption that his anti-Archimedeanism 
and his value-monism are integrally connected.
2. DWORKIN AT HIS BEST: A FEW QUERIES
Although the tone of  Dworkin’s 1996 article is sometimes counterproductively 
supercilious, and although the argumentation is sometimes excessively compressed 
(occasionally to the point of  glibness or misleadingness), his approach as a whole 
is extraordinarily incisive and refreshing. The gist of  that article is carried forward 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
????????????????? ?????????????? ?????????????????? ????????????????????????????????
I agree with Dworkin’s general insistence that meta-ethical questions are substantive 
??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ????????
First, Dworkin6????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
partners make about the mechanics of  sex raise no moral issues: they think that all 
judgments that condemn certain sexual choices are false. They ground this limited 
3  KRAMER, Matthew. In Defense of  Legal Positivism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999, Chap. 6
4  Should note that I greatly admire Dworkin’s political philosophy as it is presented in Dworkin 2000. 
See Kramer 2001. Nonetheless, my own account of  justice (developed in a book-in-progress entitled 
A Stoical Theory of  Justice) is markedly different from his.
5  DWORKIN, Ronald. ???????????? ????????. Cambridge (MA), USA: Harvard University Press, 2011.
6  DWORKIN, ???????????? ???????? ???????????p. 33.
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skepticism in positive opinions about what makes acts right or wrong; they do not 
believe that the details of  adult consensual sex, whether heterosexual or homosexual, 
have any right- or wrong-making features.’ Now, as a moral term, the adjective ‘right’ 
can be an antonym of  ‘wrong’ or a synonym of  ‘correct.’ Although those two senses of  
the adjective are not mutually exclusive, they are not equivalent. We are interested here 
????????????????????? ????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????? ???????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
permissible; engaging in such a course of  conduct will not breach any moral duties and 
will therefore not amount to a wrong.
Given this construal of  the term, all or most of  the people who believe that ‘the 
mechanics of  sex raise no moral issues’ are thereby taking the view that various sexual 
practices between consenting adults are right. That is, they are taking the view that such 
practices are morally permissible. When they deem condemnations of  those practices 
to be mistaken, they typically are not assuming that the practices lie outside the reach 
of  morality altogether (like the orbiting of  the planet Earth around the sun or the 
???????????? ?? ? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ???? ??????? ?? ? ?????????? ???????? ????????? ?????
typically believe that the practices are located within the domain of  morality as morally 
permissible modes of  conduct – which is why the aforementioned condemnations 
are false. Hence, insofar as Dworkin purports to be recounting a position that is quite 
widely espoused, he errs in designating it as a variety of  skepticism. It is not even a 
highly circumscribed variety of  skepticism.
???????? ????????????????? ????????????????????????????? ? ?????????????????????? ?????
that the other skeptical doctrines in his taxonomy deny that certain moral assertions 
are ever true, his characterization of  moral relativism as skeptical is inapposite7. His 
thought seems to be that moral relativists will insist on the falsity of  any statement 
which maintains that some mode of  conduct possesses a univocal moral status across 
all the communities where such conduct might take place. As he writes: ‘Another now 
popular opinion holds that no universal moral claim is sound because morality is relative 
to culture; this view, too, is internally skeptical because it relies on the conviction that 
morality rises only out of  the practices of  particular communities’8. However, given 
that any utterance of  a universal moral claim will take place in a community of  people 
whose shared moral sentiments set what relativists perceive as the truth-conditions 
for the claim, relativists will accept that any universal moral judgment is truth-apt and 
that it may well be true wherever it is uttered. Although moral relativism is indeed 
????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ????????????????????????????
7 Ibíd., p. 34.
8 Ibíd.
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broadsides focus not on the determinate correctness of  answers to moral questions but 
instead on the existential mind-independence of  moral principles. A moral relativist can 
accept that there are uniquely correct positive answers to countless moral questions, 
but she will of  course construe the semantics or the truth-conditions of  those answers 
relativistically. In so doing, she is not displaying skepticism in Dworkin’s sense. She is 
not doubting that sundry far-reaching ascriptions of  moral properties to modes of  
conduct can be true. She is not doubting that propositions such as ‘Torture is always 
and everywhere wrong’ can be true. Rather, she is presupposing that the truth or falsity 
of  any such ascription of  wrongness to torture will hinge on the shared convictions of  
the people who make up the community in which the ascription is propounded9.
Third, more important than the foregoing quibbles – and various other quibbles that 
might be raised10 – is the matter of  Dworkin’s dismissiveness toward the minimalist or 
?????????????????????? ????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????
midst of  his effort to present moral reasoning as a type of  conceptual interpretation. 
His rejoinder to minimalism runs as follows:
 We cannot, however, take this view of  the concept of  truth as it appears in 
philosophical controversies about truth – for example, in the controversy about 
?????????????????? ??????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????
of  truth is correct). In the mundane use, any worry about the nature of  truth 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
truth remains the focus of  attention: we cannot transfer our concern about 
its nature to concern about something else. It is correct, but wholly unhelpful, 
to say that the sentence ‘Moral judgments can be true’ is true if  and only if  
moral judgments can be true. The fact remains that philosophers disagree about 
whether moral judgments can be true because they disagree about what truth is11.
This dismissal of  minimalism is not readily fathomable. As has been emphasized 
by Paul Horwich12, the foremost contemporary proponent of  the minimalist approach 
9 For a longer discussion of  the differences between moral relativism and moral skepticism, see KRAMER, 
?????????????????????????pp. 126-8.
10 For example, when discussing response-centered accounts of  moral properties, DWORKIN, ???????? ????
????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
wrong if  it disgusts me. That plainly entails a substantive judgment: torture would be acceptable if  it 
didn’t disgust me.’ There is no entailment of  the sort posited here by Dworkin, though there would 
have been such an entailment had he been pondering the claim that torture is wrong only if  it disgusts 
him.
11 Ibíd., p. 173.
12 HORWICH, Paul. Truth. Second Edition. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998, Chap. 1; “Gibbard’s 
Theory of  Norms”, in: ?????????????????????? ??????, 22, 1993, pp. 72-3.
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
those which Dworkin has in mind. Horwich argues, indeed, that ‘all legitimate uses of  
?????????????????????????? ??????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
of  generalization is no less useful when the propositions in question are normative than 
when they are naturalistic’13. With regard to the controversy over the truth-aptitude of  
moral judgments, pace Dworkin, the minimalist approach will indeed redirect attention 
from the nature of  truth to something else – but the redirection should be welcomed 
by Dworkin, since it is highly congenial to his whole outlook. For a minimalist, after 
all, the question whether ‘Torture is wrong’ can be true is equivalent to the question 
whether torture can be wrong. In other words, the redirection of  attention is from 
the nature of  truth to substantive morality. A similar redirection occurs when we have 
???????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
to bear on a question about the truth-aptitude of  moral judgments generally.
??? ???????????? ????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????? ??????????????
aptitude of  moral judgments is not quite as clear-cut as the straightforward universal 
?????????????? ??? ???? ????????? ?????? ???????? ??????????? ???? ???? ??? ??? ?????????
???? ?????????????? ??? ???? ????????? ???????? ?????? ??????????? ???? ??? ?????? ????????
???????????? ?????????????? ?????? ???? ??? ???????????? ?????????14, straightforward 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
aptitude of  moral judgments hinges on the truth-aptitude of  absolutely everything 
????? ??? ???????????? ??? ?? ?????? ??????????? ??? ????? ????????? ???? ????????? ?? ? ??? ?????
??? ????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ????????????? ??? ???????????????
??????????????? ???????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????15.
In any event, the main point here is that a minimalist understanding of  the question 
redirects attention from the nature of  truth to matters of  morality. Instead of  wondering 
whether some substantial number of  ascriptions of  moral properties to modes of  
conduct can be true, we shall be wondering whether sundry modes of  conduct can 
partake of  the moral properties that are ascribed to them by some substantial number 
of  moral judgments. That redirection of  attention is precisely what someone of  
Dworkin’s anti-Archimedean bent should welcome. It is entirely consistent with his 
13 HORWICH, ???????????????? ???????????p. 73.
14? ????????? ??? ??????????? ??????? ??? ??? ?????????????? ?????????? ???????? ?? ? ???? ????????? ?????? ???
inconsistent with external skepticism, it would be consistent with a global variety of  internal skepticism.
15 POTTS, Timothy. ?????????????????????????? ???? ????????????????????? ????????. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994, pp. 259-60.
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elaboration of  an interpretive method for tackling the abstract and concrete moral 
???????? ???????? ?????????????????? ??????????????? ? ??? ??????????????????????????16.
3. DWORKIN ON VALUE-PLURALISM: SOME PRELIMINARY POINTS
Despite a number of  missteps on points of  detail (only a few of  which have been 
broached above), Dworkin is at his best in his critique of  meta-ethics. His critique 
leaves ample room for meta-ethical theorizing, but valuably helps to make clear that 
such theorizing is located within the ethical domain rather than beyond it. Dworkin’s 
achievement along those lines is highly commendable.
Far less persuasive is his insistence on the unity of  value. Dworkin himself  takes 
that insistence to be integrally connected to his anti-Archimedeanism, for he writes 
at an early point in his book that the meta-ethical positions which he combats are 
‘dear to a fox’s heart’17. Neither Dworkin’s value-monism nor his connection of  that 
doctrine to his anti-Archimedeanism is tenable. Within the bounds of  a short review, 
I cannot provide a wide-ranging rejoinder to Dworkin on these points. Hence, the 
??????????? ??? ??? ????? ???????? ????? ???????????? ??? ???? ????????? ???????? ??????? ?????
?????? ???????? ???? ????? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ???? ????????? ???????? ????????
and other values such as democracy and equality. Justice for Hedgehogs continues his 
?????????????????????????????????????????
Before we turn to that discussion, however, the limits of  my disagreement with 
???????? ??????? ??? ????????????? ??????? ?? ? ???? ??????????? ?? ? ???? ?????? ?? ? ?????? ?????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
be wholly unexceptionable18. The content of  every such principle is indeed partly 
constrained and determined by the content of  every other such principle19. Someone 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
basic ethical values is ineliminable. That is, someone can coherently insist as much 
while denying that a correct understanding of  the basic principles of  ethics will reveal 
16 Admittedly, he says that minimalism is wholly unhelpful rather than incorrect. However, when he 
indicates why minimalism would be wholly unhelpful, he appears not to be aware that the minimalist 
?????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
17 DWORKIN, ???????????? ???????? ???????????p. 24.
18 Dworkin quite reasonably distinguishes between ethics and morality (2011, 13-15 et passim). I have 
long used the terms ‘ethics’ and ‘ethical’ more broadly to encompass both morality and the sorts of  
matters which Dworkin denotes through those terms. I am here and elsewhere adhering to my own 
broader sense of  each of  those words.
19 KRAMER, ?????????????????????????pp. 363-4.
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????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????
I am not addressing any milder thesis about the interconnectedness of  basic ethical 
values.
???????? ??? ??????????? ??? ???? ? ???? ????? ????????? ???????? ???????????? ????????
values are inevitable (either in any given context or in general). Although the occurrence 
?? ?????????????????????? ?? ????? ?? ?????????? ???????? ????????? ?????? ??????????? ??? ??????
possibility. This point should be emphasized because Dworkin sometimes writes as 
??????? ???? ?????????? ???????? ????? ????????? ???????? ?????? ???????? ??????? ???????
ineluctably. For example, when commenting on Isaiah Berlin’s admonitions about 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
‘Berlin’s history warns us that bad philosophy is dangerous, but it does not show that 
?????????????????? ?????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
of  liberty inevitable’20. Berlin’s writings are not unequivocal on the point in question 
– or on most other points, for that matter – but Dworkin’s comment is exegetically 
defensible. However, the general doctrine of  value-pluralism does not depend on any 
assertions about the unavoidability of  clashes between major ethical values. Although 
clashes between those values are abidingly possible and over time are highly likely, a 
value-pluralist is not committed to the proposition that such clashes have to emerge.
Third, although I am taking issue with Dworkin’s doctrine of  the unity of  value, 
his elaboration of  that doctrine is impressively systematic and well-structured. His 
lines of  reasoning are elegant and sophisticated even though I remain unpersuaded 
by his overall position. Moreover, notwithstanding my dissent from his general value-
monism, I concur with many of  his more detailed points. My remarks in the next 
section, which include some severe strictures, do not bespeak any blanket disagreement 
with his sundry ethical ruminations.
4. DWORKIN ON LIBERTY
One of  the most striking features of  Dworkin’s discussions of  liberty in Justice for 
Hedgehogs is his nearly complete inattention to the vast philosophical literature that 
has proliferated during the decades since the publication of  Berlin’s famous essay on 
negative and positive liberty21. Dworkin does refer en passant to an essay on freedom 
20 DWORKIN, ???????????? ???????? ???????????p. 366.
21 Much of  that literature is cited in Kramer 2003, and much of  it is excerpted in CARTER, Ian; KRAMER, 
Matthew; STEINER, Hillel (eds). ????????? ??????????????? ????????. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2007. Among 
the political philosophers who have made important contributions to that literature – contributions 
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by his close friend Bernard Williams and to a short book on the topic by his close 
friend Charles Fried22. Otherwise, however, neither in the relevant portions of  his new 
tome nor in any of  his previous writings does Dworkin display the slightest awareness 
of  the aforementioned literature. He does not cite or discuss anything else from it, and 
indeed his chapter on liberty in Justice for Hedgehogs cites only two writings more 
recent than Berlin’s essay: the book by Fried, and a work on American constitutional 
theory by Dworkin’s friend Stephen Breyer. Good though the three publications by 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
hardly compensate for Dworkin’s cavalier disregard of  the multitudinous writings of  
?????????????????????????? ??????????????? ????????????????????? ?? ??????????? ???? ?????
been too busy to become familiar with those writings, he should have delegated the 
task to one of  the seven research assistants whom he thanks in his Preface.
???????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????? ??????????????
with the contemporary philosophical literature on the topic, the harshness of  my tone in 
the preceding paragraph might be excessive. However, his treatment of  negative liberty 
is in fact seriously marred by his failure to keep abreast of  that literature. Dworkin 
attributes ridiculous theses to his opponents, and he never comes to grips with the 
subtle and sophisticated arguments which they have actually put forward. Moreover, he 
is quite mistaken insofar as he thinks that their arguments purport to be Archimedean.
I will concentrate here on two passages in which Dworkin sets up and knocks down 
?????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
liberty. Dworkin writes as follows:
 Consider, for example, John Stuart Mill’s classic account of  liberty: this is the 
freedom, he said, to do what one wants. If  that is what liberty is, then of  course 
that are altogether ignored by Dworkin (though he has jousted with a few of  these philosophers on 
other issues) – are Richard Arneson, Stanley Benn, Ian Carter, John Christman, G.A. Cohen, Lawrence 
Crocker, J.P. Day, Keith Dowding, Joel Feinberg, Richard Flathman, Michael Garnett, Gerald Gaus, 
Michael Gorr, John Gray, Tim Gray, Friedrich Hayek, Nancy Hirschmann, Thomas Hurka, Peter Jones, 
Kristján Kristjánsson, Chandran Kukathas, Will Kymlicka, Charles Larmore, Gerald MacCallum, 
Christopher Megone, David Miller, Robert Nozick, Onora O’Neill, Serena Olsaretti, Felix Oppenheim, 
Prasanta Pattanaik, Philip Pettit, Joseph Raz, David Schmidtz, Amartya Sen, Ronen Shnayderman, 
Hillel Steiner, Robert Sugden, Christine Swanton, Charles Taylor, Michael Taylor, Martin van Hees, 
Philippe van Parijs, Albert Weale, William Weinstein, Jonathan Wolff, and Robert Young. I disagree 
strongly with the positions taken by some of  these philosophers, but I pursue my disagreements 
with them by examining their writings rather than by remaining loftily ignorant of  them. Among the 
philosophers to whose remarks on liberty I have previously taken exception is, of  course, Ronald 
Dworkin. See KRAMER, Matthew. ?????????????? ????????. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003, 
p. 71 n69, p. 101 n91; ?????????????????????????pp. 114-17, 122.
22  DWORKIN, ???????????? ???????? ???????????p. 350, 481.
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any government must constantly abridge liberty; it does so when it prohibits 
rape or arson. But we are then confronted with a dilemma. It is necessary to 
make arson and rape criminal, but do we nevertheless commit a special kind of  
?????????????????????? ????? ???????????????????????????????? ??????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
not really value liberty for its own sake or take liberty as such to be essential to 
dignity. We only value something else often associated with liberty. But what 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
liberty. We must explain what makes one liberty more fundamental than another, 
and we cannot explain that by supposing that some commodity we name liberty 
is more at stake when a fundamental liberty is in question23.
One of  the oddities of  this passage is that it does not advert to a genuine and glaring 
weakness in Mill’s account of  liberty – a weakness that has been pointed out by many 
negative-liberty theorists from Berlin onward. That is, by tying freedom to actually 
occurrent desires, Mill left open the possibility that a person’s freedom can be enhanced 
through the removal of  some of  her desires. Suppose that Sally is currently prevented 
from doing several things that she wants to do. Mill’s conception of  freedom implies 
????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????
of  any preventative factors or through the elimination of  the relevant desires. No such 
account of  freedom as a desideratum of  political morality is tenable.
More important in the present context is Dworkin’s failure to distinguish between the 
lessening of  each person’s overall freedom and the removal of  particular freedoms or 
combinations of  freedoms from each person. (Such a distinction has become especially 
prominent in the philosophical literature on freedom during the past couple of  decades.) 
Mechanisms of  enforcement that stand ready to give effect to legal prohibitions on 
rape and arson will remove certain combinations of  freedoms from virtually everyone, 
????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ???????????????????????
markedly lowering the incidence of  freedom-curtailing misconduct on the part of  other 
people. For nearly every person, the combinations of  freedoms that get protected are 
much more wide-ranging than the combinations that get taken away. In any credibly 
possible world, the net effect of  such mechanisms of  enforcement will be greatly 
freedom-expanding. Thus, if  the term ‘liberty’ is understood to denote a political value 
such as the promotion of  individual freedom, the legal prohibitions mentioned by 
Dworkin are in furtherance of  liberty rather than in abridgement of  it – as are any 
reasonable restrictions on the driving of  automobiles, for example.
23 Ibíd., p. 345.
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At the end of  the quoted passage, Dworkin returns to a theme which he has sounded 
in some of  his past work on liberty. That is, he is keen to dismiss the notion that liberty 
can properly be understood as a ‘commodity’ that is at stake to varying degrees when 
particular freedoms or combinations of  freedoms are eliminated. His dismissal of  that 
notion is more emphatic and sustained in Taking Rights Seriously, where he asks us to 
compare a law that prohibits ordinary citizens from speaking on political issues with a 
law that prohibits people from driving their cars uptown on Lexington Avenue24. He 
contests any claim that ‘the citizen is deprived of  the same commodity, namely liberty, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
taken away from him is, for some reason, either greater in amount or greater in its 
? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
warranted when it was published 35 years ago, the past few decades have witnessed 
a huge outpouring of  publications that address the matter of  measuring freedom25. 
Having remained blithely unacquainted with those publications, Dworkin over the 
course of  35 years has preserved his arguments in amber without up-dating them.
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
a diminution in liberty by calculating the extent of  frustration that it induces’, and he 
rightly rejects that approach to the matter. He then broaches an alternative approach: 
‘We might take a different tack, and measure the degree of  loss of  liberty by the 
impact that a particular constraint has on future choices. But we should then have to 
admit that the ordinary criminal code reduces choice for most men more than laws 
which forbid fringe political activity.’ Here Dworkin commits the same misstep that 
vitiates his discussion in the long passage from Justice for Hedgehogs above. That is, 
he looks only at the ways in which certain well-enforced laws eliminate freedoms or 
combinations of  freedoms, and he does not consider at all the ways in which those laws 
expand people’s freedoms or combinations of  freedoms by protecting them against the 
freedom-reducing misconduct of  other people. Such an omission fatally undermines 
his riposte to the thesis that freedom is a measurable property.
24 DWORKIN, Ronald. ???????????????????????. Cambridge (MA), USA: Harvard University Press, 1977, p. 
270.
25  Many of  the relevant publications are excerpted or cited in Part IX of  CARTER, KRAMER, and STEINER, 
???????? My own main contribution to the philosophical literature on the measurement of  freedom is in 
??????????????????? ?KRAMER, ?????????????? ?????????
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A similar error occurs in the principal chapter on liberty in Justice for Hedgehogs, 
where Dworkin26 again imputes to his opponents the view that ‘of  course democracy 
????????? ????? ????????? ???????? ???? ????? ?? ? ???????????? ?????????? ??????????? ???
impossible without criminal law and other forms of  regulation.’ Instead of  dwelling 
afresh upon Dworkin’s failure to distinguish between (i) the effects of  laws on some 
???????????????????????? ???????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
overall freedom of  each person, we should scrutinize another aspect of  his position. 
Whereas most philosophers use the terms ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’ interchangeably, 
Dworkin stipulatively distinguishes between them: ‘Someone’s total freedom is his 
power to act in whatever way he might wish, unimpeded by constraints or threats 
imposed by others or by a political community. His negative liberty is the area of  his 
freedom that a political community cannot take away without injuring him in a special 
way: compromising his dignity by denying him equal concern or an essential feature 
of  responsibility for his own life’27??????????? ???????????????????????? ?????????????? ?
freedom is problematic in some respects, we should concentrate here instead on his 
??????????????? ?????????????? ??????????????????
Dworkin has held to his position on negative liberty for many years, and has taken 
no steps whatsoever to defend that position against the telling objections raised by Ian 
Carter and others28. What is dubious about Dworkin’s remarks is that they present a 
??????????????????????? ? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ? ????
following two theses: (1) the prevention of  some action or state of  affairs does not 
eliminate any liberties or combinations of  liberties unless the prevention is wrongful; 
(2) the prevention of  some action or state of  affairs does not eliminate any liberties or 
combinations of  liberties unless the stymied action or state of  affairs would have been 
legitimate. In the most recent quotation above, Dworkin seems to have in mind the 
??????? ?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
26  DWORKIN, ???????????? ???????? ???????????p. 367.
27  Ibíd., p. 366.
28  See, for example, CARTER, Ian. A Measure of  Freedom. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 
69-74; KRAMER, ???? ????????? ???????????pp. 114-17; WILLIAMS, Bernard. “From Freedom to Liberty: The 
Construction of  a Political Value”, in: ?????????????????????? ??????, 30, 2001, pp. 13-14. For some further 
critiques of  moralized conceptions of  liberty, see COHEN, G. A. ?????????????????????????????????????. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 53-65; History, Labour, Freedom. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 251-3, 256, 292-6; “Illusions about Private Property and Freedom”. 
In: MEPHAM, John & DAVID-HILLEL, Ruben (eds.) ?????????? ??????????????????? ??????????Brighton, UK: 
Harvester Press, 1981, pp. 226-9; “Capitalism, Freedom, and the Proletariat”. In: RYAN, Alan (ed.) The 
Idea of  Freedom. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 11-3; KRAMER, ?????????????? ?????
cit., pp. 100-3; KYMLICKA, Will. ??????????????????????????????????????????????????. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 1990, pp. 138, 145-51.
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theses29) Any such approach is problematic for a number of  reasons, but perhaps the 
most frequently voiced complaint by Dworkin’s critics is that his moralized conception 
eliminates the value of  liberty as a distinctive political ideal. Writing with reference to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
work a distinction that parallels the freedom/liberty duality in Justice for Hedgehogs 
Carter makes this point forcefully.
To be interested only in liberty in Dworkin’s ‘normative’ sense is to imply that there 
??????????? ?????????????????????? ???????? ? ????????? ??? ??? ????????? ??????? ????? ??????????
that liberty has a ‘distinct quality and value’. Any defence of  an ideal which involves 
??????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
‘uninteresting’ sense that we are able to accord liberty a ‘distinct quality and value’30.
Carter’s worries are amply borne out by Dworkin’s treatment of  liberty in Justice 
for Hedgehogs. Consider, for example, the following remark about the moral status 
of  taxation: ‘The familiar right-wing complaint that taxation is an assault on liberty is 
mistaken. But the mistake is not conceptual: it is a mistake about justice. The structure 
and level of  taxation in force may invade liberty if  it is unjust – if  it does not show 
equal concern and respect for all’31. Here the value of  justice is doing all the work. 
In Dworkin’s eyes, questions about invasions of  liberty are questions about injustice. 
Accordingly, in his eyes, the value of  liberty partakes of  no distinctive political 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????? ?????????
In need of  emphasis here is that Carter’s objections and other objections to 
Dworkin’s moralized conception of  liberty have nothing to do with Archimedeanism. 
Those objections are overtly grounded on considerations of  political morality. When 
Dworkin’s critics resist his monistic re-elaboration of  various political values as aspects 
of  justice, they are doing so squarely within the domain of  moral argumentation. 
They are not claiming anything at odds with his critique of  meta-ethics in the opening 
portions of  his new tome. Foxes can be as staunchly anti-Archimedean as Dworkin 
himself.
29 KRAMER, ?????????????? ??????????p. 115.
30 CARTER, A Measure?? ???? ?????? p. 72, emphases in original, footnote omitted. Because Dworkin had 
not distinguished between “freedom” and “liberty” in his early writings, Carter is using those terms 
interchangeably in this quoted passage (as most political philosophers do).
31 DWORKIN, ???????????? ???????? ???????????p. 375.
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5. CONCLUSION
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
???????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
???? ?????????????? ???? ???????? ?????? ?? ? ?????????? ????????? ??? ???????????? ??? ?? ????
accomplishment. Less commendable are his endeavors to wrap all ethical values into 
one. Although not every argument in the latter half  of  the volume is as stale as his 
arguments concerning liberty, and although the sheer scale of  his project is impressive, 
value-pluralists have no reason to retreat into their foxholes in response to Dworkin’s 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
they should resist his value-unifying blandishments.
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